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STEFFAN v. ASPIN: GAYS IN THE MILITARY
WIN A VICTORY-OR DID THEY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A person with the bravery of Audie Murphy,' the charisma of
Colin Powell,2 the tactical mind of Robert E. Lee,3 and the leadership

ability of Douglas MacArthur4 would surely be the ultimate military
commander. Nevertheless, the United States military would consider
such a person lacking sufficient aptitude to serve their country if he or
she was a homosexual. Despite President Clinton's recent "Don't ask,
from
don't tell, don't pursue" policy,5 homosexuals are separated
6
every branch of the military based on status or conduct.
Until recently,7 members of the United States military have had
little success challenging the constitutionality of the military's policy
of excluding homosexuals.8 In Steffan v. Aspin,9 the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the D.C. Circuit) held that the military's policy of excluding gays based on status 10
1. Audie Murphy was the most decorated American soldier of World War II, with twelve
decorations for valor, including the Congressional Medal of Honor. COLONEL HAROLD B. SIMPSON, AUDIE MURPHY, AMERICAN SOLDIER (1975).
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1989 to 1993.
3. Commanding General of all Confederate forces during the Civil War.
4. Supreme Allied Commander, Pacific during World War II.
5. President's Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the Military,
29 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1369-73 (July 19, 1993).
6. See 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, § 1.H (1993).
7. See, e.g., Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, Nos. 93-55242, 93-56354, 1994
WL 467311 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994); Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Dahli v. Secretary of United States
Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1993); Selland v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993).
8. The military's policy has consistently been upheld as constitutional. See, e.g., Pruitt v.
Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v.
United States Army, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1984).
9. 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted,8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
10. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, § 1.H.1.c.(2) (1993). This regulation provides:
The basis for separation may include preservice, prior service, or current service conduct or statements. A member shall be separated under this section if one or more of
the following approved findings is made:
1)...
The member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual unless there
2)
is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual or bisexual.
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is unconstitutional. Subsequently, however, the court vacated its
opinion and voted to rehear the entire case en banc.11
This note scrutinizes the military's policy toward gays while specifically focusing on the Steffan v. Aspin opinion. Furthermore, this
note concludes that on rehearing the D.C. Circuit should hold that the
military's regulation discharging homosexuals is unconstitutional.
However, such a decision should not be reached because the regulation fails the rational basis test. Instead, the court should find that
discrimination based on sexual orientation is subject to strict scrutiny
and the military's interest in such a regulation does not withstand this
most rigid standard.12
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

The validity of the military's regulation, or for that matter any
law that is subject to a constitutional challenge under the equal protection clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments,13 depends on
the standard of review applied by the examining court. Three levels
of review are used to analyze equal protection claims: "strict scrutiny," "intermediate scrutiny," and "rational basis."' 14 Strict scrutiny, 15
the highest tier of review, is applied whenever a governmental regulation imposes on fundamental individual rights' 6 or certain classes of
Id. (emphasis added).
11. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 70.
12. But see Spiro P. Fotopoulos, Note, The Beginning of the End for the Military's Traditional Policy on Homosexuals: Steffan v. Aspin, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 611 (1994) (characterizing the Steffan case as a major victory).
13. See Weinberger v. Vliesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). "This Court's approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
14. It appears, however, that another level of review has been developed to fit in between
intermediate review and the rational basis test. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (characterizing its analysis of a denial for a zoning permit for a mentally
retarded home as the rational basis test, but applying a "heightened" level of scrutiny); Pruitt v.
Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.) (characterizing its analysis as "active rational basis review"),
cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
15. The regulation must be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest and
must be the least restrictive alternative. See, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (applying the "most rigid scrutiny" to determine the constitutionality of military regulations which discriminate based on race).
16. The Supreme Court has recognized that fundamental rights include the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and the right of access to the courts, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
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individuals which comprise a suspect class.' 7 The lowest level of review in analyzing equal protection claims is the rational basis test,",
which is used when the challenge does not qualify for stricter review.19
Intermediate scrutiny2' was developed as the bridge between strict
scrutiny review and rational basis review because once a court decides
that strict scrutiny is the level of review, the statute will invariably be
struck down, and conversely where rational basis is used, the statute

will most likely be upheld. 2 ' This test is applied to cases where the
22
regulation imposes on rights that are not considered fundamental,
and where a class of people can not be considered a "suspect class. '
Since a court's determination of the applicable standard of review is
often dispositive with respect to the underlying issues, the standard of
review applied by the D.C. Circuit is of the utmost importance. 24
17. Three main suspect classes exists. Regulations that discriminate based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to statute
prohibiting interracial marriage); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (applying strict
scrutiny to state laws requiring separate but equal education between whites and non-whites).
Statutes that discriminate based on national origin are subject to strict scrutiny. See Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny to discrimination against Mexican Americans with regards to jury duty). Finally, statutes that discriminate based on alienage are also
subject to strict scrutiny. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to state
statutes that denied resident aliens the opportunity to practice law).
18. As long as the regulation furthers a legitimate purpose, the regulation will be upheld as
constitutional. "[In general, a government regulation will be presumed to be valid under equal
protection analysis as long as the classification drawn by the regulation 'rationally furthers some
legitimate, articulated state purpose."' Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989)
(quoting McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)).
19. See, e.g., Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 82, 87 (D. Del. 1980) (stating
that all other classifications will be reviewed under the standard of minimum rationality), affd,
652 F.2d 1152 (3rd Cir. 1981).
20. To survive scrutiny, the means chosen, must be substantially related and carefully tailored to achieving an important governmental objective. See, ag., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
21. Professor Gerald Gunther has characterized strict scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact." Gerald Gunther, Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. Rnv. 1, 8 (1972). See also Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335, 338 (D. Kan. 1986); Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. at
87.
22. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down Texas law that allowed school
districts to deny free public education to illegal-alien children).
23. Those classes that are not "suspect classes" are labeled "quasi-suspect." See Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982). Intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on gender. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). It also applies to classifications
based on illegitimacy. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
(1982); Trimble v. Gordon 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
24. This determination is not dispositive in every instance. For instance, in Steffan the court
applied the rational basis test and held that the Navy's regulation was unconstitutional.
Although the court came to the correct conclusion, a stricter standard of review should have
been used. See infra part V.
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BACKGROUND

Facts of the Case

Joseph C. Steffan was admitted to the United States Naval Academy in 1983. From the beginning, it was apparent Steffan would be an
exceptional midshipman and was destined for greatness as a Naval
officer.' Steffan consistently received outstanding marks for his leadership ability and military performance.26 Not only did Steffan distinguish himself in the classroom,2 7 but he also excelled at extracurricular
activities." Upon graduation, Steffan was slated for duty aboard a
nuclear submarine,2 9 one of the most prestigious assignments in the
Navy. Steffan's career as a Naval officer seemed set-until his final
semester at the Academy, when the Naval Intelligence Service (the
NIS) received a report that Steffan had told another student he was
30
gay.
After receiving this report in February of 1987, the NIS immediately began its investigation. 3 ' In March, Steffan learned he was
32
under investigation and approached an Academy chaplin for advice.
Steffan admitted his homosexuality to the chaplin, who in turn offered
to help Steffan plead his case before the Commandant of Midshipmen 33 to assure his graduation. 4 The chaplin was unsuccessful,
and the Commandant advised the chaplin that Steffan should obtain
25. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57,59 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'gin bane granted,8 F.3d

70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
26. In his sophomore year, instructors characterized him as "gifted," and an "outstanding
performer" who had "exhibited excellent leadership." In addition to being praised as an "asset
to the Academy" in his junior year, Steffan was selected as the Regimental Commander of one
half of his class-roughly 500 midshipmen. The glowing reviews continued when he was said to
be a "model for his classmates and subordinates," and having a "dedication to superior performance." Steffan would "undoubtedly make an outstanding naval officer." In his senior year, he
became Battalion Commander, one of the ten highest ranking midshipmen at the Academy, with
direct command over one-sixth of the Academy's 4,500 midshipmen. Id.
27. Academically he ranked in the top ten percent of his class. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F.
Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and
reh'g in banc granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
28. In his junior and senior years he sang the National Anthem as a soloist at the annual
Army-Navy football game on national television. For these performances, he was awarded a
Citation from the Superintendent of the Academy. In his senior year, he also served as President and Cantor of the Catholic Choir and was the lead soloist for the Naval Academy Glee
Club. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 59.
29. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 5.
30. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 59.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The Commandant of Midshipmen is the second highest ranking officer at the Naval
Academy.
34. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 59.
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legal counsel.35 On March 23, Steffan met with the Commandant and
admitted his homosexuality. 36 The Commandant informed Steffan
that it was unlikely that he would graduate and that a Brigade
Military
37
day.
next
the
convened
be
would
Performance Board
At the Performance Board hearing, Steffan refused to present
any evidence that he was not a homosexual and again admitted that
he was a homosexual. 8 After closed deliberations, the Board decided
to change Steffan's military performance rating from "A" to "F", to
suspend him from classes, and to recommend his discharge for "insufficient aptitude for commissioned service."'39 On March 26, the Commandant agreed with the Performance Board's decision, and
recommended that Steffan be separated' from the Academy.41
On April 1, Steffan was notified that the Academy intended to
recommend his discharge to the Secretary of the Navy.42 He was also
advised that his discharge was a foregone conclusion, which would require his military record to reflect his homosexuality as the reason for
the discharge. 43 Steffan was told, however, that his resignation would
result in an honorable discharge without any notation of his homosexuality appearing in his record. 44 If he did not resign, his involuntary
discharge would assuredly damage his future job prospects.4' That
same day, just six weeks before his graduation and after four years of
exemplary performance, Steffan submitted his qualified resignation'
from the Academy.47
More than eighteen months later, on December 9, 1988, Steffan
wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, requesting that his resignation be
35. ld.
36. Id.at 60.
37. Id.
38. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 60.
39. Id.
40. Discharge of homosexuals from the military is termed "separation." See 32 C.F.R. pt.
41, app. A, § 1 (1993).
41. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 60.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 60.
46. "A 'qualified' resignation is one that is conditioned on something. In this case the resignation was qualified in the sense that it was in lieu of the Superintendent's recommendation of
discharge based on [Steffan's] insufficient aptitude for commissioned naval service, as determined by the Academic Board." Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 3 n.7 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd
sub nora. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted,8 F.3d
70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
47. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 60.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 6

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:171

withdrawn and that his diploma be awarded.4" On February 9, 1989,
the Secretary denied his request. 4 9 The sole basis stated for this denial
was Steffan's "status" as a homosexual, as exhibited by his unrebutted
admission before the Performance Board."
B. ProceduralHistory of the Case
On December 29, 1988, Steffan fied suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Superintendent of the Naval
Academy, and the Commandant of Midshipmen (the Navy).5 1 His
complaint alleged that his separation from the Academy, which was
based solely on his status as a homosexual, violated his constitutional
rights of free speech and association, due process, and equal
protection.5
Steffan's suit survived an initial motion to dismiss challenging his
standing to sue 3 Shortly thereafter, a dispute arose regarding Steffan's deposition. At the deposition, Steffan was asked whether he had
ever engaged in homosexual acts. 4 Steffan denied having engaged in
homosexual acts prior to his admission to the Academy. 5 At the direction of his attorney, he refused to answer whether he had engaged
in any acts while enrolled at the Academy or since departing from the
Academy.5 6 His refusal to answer these questions prompted the Navy

to seek sanctions.5 Specifically, the Navy asked the court to dismiss
the suit, or in the alternative, to enter an order establishing as fact that
Steffan had engaged in homosexual acts.5 Steffan argued that such
information was irrelevant.5 9
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 1I
51. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 60.
52. Id. In the alternative, Steffan claimed that the Navy both denied him equal protection
and violated the Administrative Procedure Act when the Academy truncated his discharge proceedings. Id.
53. Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 115 (D.D.C. 1989).
54. "A homosexual act means bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted,
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires." 32 C.F.R. pt. 41,
app. A, § 1.H.1.b.(3) (1993).
55. Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121, 123 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 122. The sanctions sought by the Navy were pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. at 122.
58. 1I at 121.
59. During the hearing, the following exchange between the Court and plaintiff's counsel
took place:
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While admitting that Steffan was discharged based on status in-

stead of conduct,' the Court determined that the information sought
by the Navy was relevant.61 Accordingly, in November of 1989 the
case was dismissed with prejudice. 62 In support of its holding, the
court noted at the outset the deferential treatment consistently given
to the military's enforcement of its own regulations.63 Furthermore,
since refusal to allow a person to reenlist after an admission of homosexuality had been upheld as constitutional," the court concluded that
Steffan's homosexual acts were relevant.65 Finally, the court maintained that since Steffan brought the suit, he could not use his constitutional rights "as a sword to frustrate the defendant's right to prepare
66
a defense.

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.67 The court held that "[j]udicial review of an administrative action is confined to '[t]he grounds ...

upon which the

record discloses that [the] action was based.' '6 8 In addition, the appellate court correctly pointed out that Steffan's suit was based on his
"status" as a homosexual. Consequently, it was error for the district
court to determine that "conduct" was at issue.6 9
THE COURT: I want to fix a date for discovery. The deposition of the plaintiff. What
do you come up with?
MR. WOLINSKY: Your honor, let me just be clear on one thing. They're trying to
turn a status case into a conduct case. In the administrative proceeding that they initiated, they discharged my client on the basis of his status. If he is asked at a deposition
have you ever engaged in conduct I'm going to direct him not to answer.
THE COURT: And I'll direct him to answer.
MR.WOLINSKY: And we will then see where we are.
THE COURT: You know where you are right now. You've got to answer it or I'll
dismiss your case. When are you going to have his deposition?
Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. at 123.
60. Id. at 124. The court noted, "[t]he record is clear that plaintiff was separated from the
Naval Academy based on his admission that he is a homosexual rather than on any evidence of
homosexual misconduct." Id.
61. Without further explanation, the court concluded "that whether plaintiff had engaged in
homosexual conduct was the 'key' question in this case because plaintiff sought restoration to
duty." Id. at 123.
62. Id. at 128.
63. Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. at 125 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986)).
64. Id. (citing Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990)).
65. Id. at 127.
66. Id.
67. Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
68. Id. at 76 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).
69.
That he seeks reinstatement as relief for an allegedly invalid separation does not put
into issue the question whether he engaged in potentially disqualifying conduct unless
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Steffan suffered another major setback slightly more than a year
later when the district court granted the Navy's motion for summary
judgment.70 The majority of the court's opinion was devoted to analyzing the constitutionality of the military's ban on homosexuals. The
court grudgingly admitted that Steffan was discharged based on his
homosexual status and not because of his homosexual conduct, 71 but
the court concluded that homosexuals are not a suspect class. 72 Thus,
the military's regulations relating to homosexuals are subject only to
rational-basis review.73 Using this standard, the court held that the
military's ban against homosexuals is rationally related to its legitimate goals.74 From this decision Steffan once again appealed to the
D.C. Circuit.7' It is the D.C. Circuit's reversal upon which this note is
based.
IV. THE STEFFAN DECISION

In reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the
D.C. Circuit determined that the Navy's regulations, which compelled
Steffan to resign solely because of his homosexual orientation, violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause.76 However, the court specifically declined to answer
whether homosexuals, as defined by orientation, are members of a
"suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class, since the court concluded that even
basis test the Navy's regulation is
under the rational
77
unconstitutional.

such conduct was a basis for his separation. If Steffan was discharged wrongfully, he
'ha[s] never been discharged[;] ... in the eyes of the law, [he] remain[s] in service.'

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dilley v. Alexander, 627 F.2d 407, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
70. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d
57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
71. "Plaintiff declined to answer questions at deposition about whether he had engaged in
homosexual conduct at the Academy. As a result, this is primarily a case about the plaintiff's
status as a homosexual." Id. at 5.
72. Id.

73. See supra part II.
74. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 12.
75. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted, 8 F.3d 70
(D.C. Cir 1994).
76. Id. at 70.
77. Id. at 63.
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The Court Applies the RationalBasis Test

Unlike the district court, which made an attempt to explain why
Steffan was not a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class,7 8 the
Court of Appeals took a short-sighted approach, and concluded that
the military's regulations could not survive even the rational basis
test. 79 Since under this standard, the court need only determine
whether the Navy's regulation rationally furthers a legitimate governmental purpose, 0 the Navy is not required to justify its regulation.8 '
In applying the rational basis test, the court began its analysis by considering the purposes of the regulation as asserted by the Navy. 2
1.

The Regulation Prevents Illegal Conduct

The Navy contended that the primary purpose of its regulation is
to exclude from the military those who have a propensity to engage in
illegal conduct, since this conduct damages the good order and discipline of the military. s3 The Navy argued that when a person admits
their homosexuality, they also admit that they engage in, desire to en4
gage in, or intend to engage in acts that are damaging to morale.
78. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 5-10. The district court concluded that Steffan was
not a member of a suspect or quasi-suspect class for two reasons. First, the court noted that
"[t]here is ample authority to support the defendant's position.., that those with a homosexual
orientation are not a suspect class." Id. at 5. Second, the court used the analysis developed in
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987), to determine whether Steffan was a member of a suspect
class. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 5-10.
79. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 63. The court stated:
Nevertheless, we will leave unaddressed one important aspect of that question. We
find it unnecessary to inquire whether homosexuals, as defined solely by orientation,
comprise a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class. We need not decide, because we find that
even if homosexuals are not accorded suspect status, the [Department of Defense] Directives cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
Id.
80. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
81. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 63. "The government is under no obligation to justify its
behavior, instead, before striking down a statute or regulation on rationality review the court
must evaluate and find wanting any potentially legitimate grounds upon which to uphold the
government's action." I& (citing Heller v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 2637,2642-43 (1993)). As a result, it is
extremely difficult to strike down a law using this test. See supra part II.
82. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 63.
83. Id. at 64. It is important to note that the Supreme Court has refrained from establishing
any general protection of adult consensual sexual activity. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), the Court upheld a Georgia law making sodomy a crime. Although, the statute did not
distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual behavior, the Court phrased the issue as
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy ....
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
84. The district court, apparently relying on the language of the regulation and without any
supporting evidence, makes the conclusory statement "that allowing admitted homosexuals to
serve alongside heterosexual members and officers in the Armed Forces would jeopardize morale, discipline and the system of rank and command." Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp 1, 12
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The D.C. Circuit determined that this was not a sufficient purpose to
justify the regulation for two reasons: (1) the Navy's asserted purpose
is contradictory with the plain language of its regulation and (2) the
Navy's purpose is based on an invalid presumption. 5
The Navy asserted that its regulation was intended to prevent homosexual conduct. 86 Since the Navy presumed that all homosexual
servicemembers desire or intend to engage in homosexual conduct, it
reasoned that servicemembers who have only a propensity to engage
in such conduct should receive the same treatment-separation-as
those who actually do.87 The D.C. Circuit concluded that this argument was insincere, because such an argument is contrary to the plain
language of the regulation. 88 While the Navy maintained that the regulation results in equal treatment for cases involving homosexual conduct as compared to homosexual status, the court determined that the
regulation treats status differently. 89 Consequently, such a contradictory purpose does not justify the regulation.
(D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in
banc granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994). In oral arguments before the court, the Navy described
a person who admits their homosexual orientation, but does not engage in homosexual activity,
as a "celibate homosexual." Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 64. These people would not be discharged under the regulation. Id. This label may have derived from the district court's use of
the words "non-practicing homosexuals." See Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 10. The district
court failed to explain what characteristics make a person a "non-practicing homosexual." The
absurdity of the this phrase is obvious. Does a non-practicing homosexual mean only that the
person does not engage in homosexual sex, or that the person does not have any homosexual
orientations, and is thus now acting as a heterosexual?
85. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 64.
86. Id.
87. Id. The district court found that such a presumption was reasonable and warranted the
military's regulation. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 12-13. "Unless it can be shown that the
plaintiff has some commitment to celibate living, the presumption must be, and it is rational for
the Navy to believe, that plaintiff could one day have acted on his preferences in violation of
regulations prohibiting such conduct." ld. at 13. The district court went even further by saying
that if homosexuals are ever to be accepted in society, it should come through "moral choices of
the people and their elected representatives, not through the ukase of this court." Id. at 13
(citing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Many prejudices are based
on moral convictions, and for the most part biases against homosexuals would be included in this
type of prejudice. However, a court should not shirk its social responsibility when such a prejudice serves no real purpose. In Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
U.S. Supreme Court did not wait for elected representatives to remedy the segregation of public
schools. Likewise, the district court should have taken steps to remedy the Navy's discrimination against homosexuals.
88. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 64.
89. Ii
[B]oth c(1) and c(2) are aimed at the same thing: homosexual orientation. Whether the
servicemember has engaged in homosexual conduct or has stated that he is a homosexual, he can escape dismissal by showing that he is a heterosexual. But he can never
escape dismissal, once he truthfully admits his orientation or his conduct, if he "desires"
to engage in homosexual acts. The Directives thus attack status, not conduct; and the
status they are after is defined only by one's thoughts.
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The D.C. Circuit also attacked the presumption 9° underlying the
asserted purpose, stating that the Navy's proposition "is hardly selfevident." 91 In addition, the court rejected this presumption because
of the ramification that a servicemember could be penalized without
ever engaging in homosexual conduct.' Moreover, the court explained that since our Constitution abhors the thought of the government controlling people's minds, 93 not even cases involving treason or
violations of the Smith Act 94 allow convictions based solely on
thoughts.95
The court's reliance on the plain language of the regulation was
well-founded. While a servicemember who engages in homosexual
conduct can avoid separation by establishing that he or she is heterosexual, a servicemember who admits his or her homosexuality has no
such opportunity. After an admission of homosexuality, a servicemember is practically precluded from denying their sexuality at a
later time by presenting evidence to the contrary.
The D.C. Circuit's decision is not without fault. The Navy's presumption that homosexuals will desire or intend to engage in sexual
conduct is valid, since it is reasonable to assume that a homosexual
will desire to engage in sexual conduct just as much as a heterosexual.
While the D.C. Circuit's determination that the Navy's presumption
was false invites criticism, this analysis is not necessary to the court's
rejection of the Navy's purpose for the regulation. The court could
simply have granted the presumption and still renounced the regulation based on the Navy's unconstitutional attempt to regulate the
thoughts of its servicemembers.
On its face, the court's comparison of homosexuals who desire to
engage in sex to those who consider committing treason seems wildly
unrelated, but in fact it makes an important point. It is a hallmark of

Id. at 65.
90. The Navy presumes that a person who admits their homosexuality also admits that they
engage in, desire to engage in, or intend to engage in acts that are damaging to morale.
91. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 65.
92. See id.
93. itL
at 66 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
94. Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988).
95. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F3d at 66.
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constitutional law that the thoughts of individuals must not be restricted by government regulation. 96 Therefore, the Navy's attempt to7
restrict the thoughts of its members is contrary to the Constitution.
2. The Regulation Upholds Morale, Discipline, and
Recruitment of Heterosexuals
The Navy so feared the mere presence of homosexuals, that a
purported purpose of its regulation is to protect morale and discipline
and aid in the recruitment of new members. 98 The district court considered this to be the key interest in upholding the regulation.99 The
Navy did not claim that homosexuals would have poor morale or discipline, only that heterosexuals "will be appalled at the requirement
that they serve alongside homosexuals." 1°° The D.C. Circuit noted
that the same objections were made when the military was integrated
in 1948.111 The court rejected this proffered reason and held that the
"government may not disadvantage a person on the basis of his status
or his views solely for the fear that others may be offended or angered
by them;"" ° however, it failed to adequately define the scope of its
holding.
The simple retort to such fears is that the courts have consistently
held that the prejudice of third parties cannot justify discrimination.
In Palmore v. Sidoti,0 3 the United States Supreme Court reversed a
state court's child custody order that removed the child from her
mother solely because the mother had remarried a black man. "The
96. "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men's minds." Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
97. See id. at 67. The court determined that, "the Secretary has accorded Mr. Steffan differential treatment solely because of his thoughts, as revealed by his truthful statement that he is a
homosexual. We think this is repugnant to the various common law and constitutional principles
that guard the sanctity of a person's thoughts against government control .... " Id.
98. The regulation provides: "The presence of such members adversely affects the ability of
32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app.
the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order, and morale ....
A, § 1.H.l.a (1993).
99. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F.Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8
F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994). "Surely

the government has a legitimate interest in good order and morale, the system of rank and
command, and discipline in the Military Services .... [W]e cannot say that these are not in fact
legitimate interests, or that the regulations in question do not promote them." Id.
100. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57,67 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted,8 F.3d

70 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 67-68.
102. Id. at 68-69.
103. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). The D.C. Circuit also cited City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) noting that the rationale used in Palmore also extended to the "rational basis review" of the claim made in Cleburne. But see supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
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Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate
them."'1 4 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit drew the parallel between this
type of equal protection claim and claims made under the First
Amendment. 0 5 The court referred to the "heckler's veto" where a
vocal group attempts to prevent the expression of disfavored view
points.' 6
No doubt many members of the military will harbor such inclinations. However, given that equal protection principles have not
shielded homosexuals in the past, it was not readily apparent to the
Navy that its argument lacked any merit. While the court makes sensible arguments, the bridge between these arguments and the court's
conclusion is "hardly self-evident."
It is uncertain whether application of these principles to regulations that discriminate against homosexuals has a fundamental constitutional foundation. Although the end result of the court's holding is
desirable, historically the conclusion it now reaches has never had a
constitutional foundation. For instance, the First Amendment expresses a clear mandate that one cannot be silenced solely based on
how a crowd will react. The prohibition against the "heckler's veto"
has a constitutional foundation. However, the D.C. Circuit did not
make it clear whether such a foundation exists to prohibit discrimination against homosexuals. In fact, the court went out of its way to
state that Steffan's case was based on status, not conduct. Speech was
involved when he admitted his homosexuality on a number of occasions, but this is only a truism. Steffan was discriminated against
solely for who he was, not for what he said.
The court did state that a large umbrella exists against discriminating against a class solely because of the prejudice of others.10 7 The
court used Palmore and Cleburne to support this assertion, yet makes
104. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
105. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57,68 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'gin banc granted,8 F.3d

70 (D.C. Cir 1994). "The First Amendment forbids the government to silence speech based on
the reaction of a hostile audience, unless there is a 'clear and present' danger of grave and
imminent harm." Ld.
106. Id.
107.
But a cardinal principle of equal protection law holds that the government cannot discriminate against a certain class in order to give effect to the prejudice of others. Even
if the government does not itself act out of prejudice, it cannot discriminate in an effort
to avoid the effects of others' prejudice. Such discrimination plays directly into the
hands of the bigots; it ratifies and encourages their prejudice.
Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 68.
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the leap that this rationale applies equally to homosexuals. In essence, the court seems to be following the constitutional principles
laid down in those cases, 10 8 even though these principles have never
applied to homosexuals previously. 109 It is not exactly clear whether
the court is now unequivocally holding that homosexuals cannot be
discriminated against based on the prejudice of others. If this is the
claim, the court's holding should have been much more explicitY' 0
The D.C. Circuit failed to address the Navy's claim that the regulation prevents problems with command structure. The district court,
on the other hand, cited Dronenburgv. Zech"' as a controlling case.
In a patently inappropriate example, Judge Robert Bork attempted to
illustrate the supposed danger of a homosexual using his rank to seduce lower ranking members. 2 This "danger" has absolutely nothing
to do with homosexuality. If the word heterosexual were substituted
into Judge Bork's example, the problem would be exactly the same.
The danger he identifies is "fraternization" 113 which should be punished regardless of whether a heterosexual or homosexual uses their
rank to impose themselves on lower ranking members.
108. The court is using constitutional principles that have been reserved for suspect classes,
fundamental rights, or classifications that receive heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade,
769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the plaintiff failed to cite any cases that homosexuals
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect classification).
109. The rational basis test has been consistently applied to homosexual equal protection
claims. See, e.g., Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal.
1993); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir 1990); Woodward v. United States Army, 871 F.2d 1068
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. The court states that it is using the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality
of the military's regulation. On the other hand, if the court finds an implied constitutional basis
for prohibiting the discrimination, as it appears to be doing by examining Palmoreand Cleburne,
then it need not even reach the rational basis test. The court does not actually analyze whether
moral, discipline, and recruitment provide a rational basis for the regulation. Instead the court
merely states the regulation goes too far. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 67-69.
111. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
112.
This very case illustrates dangers of the sort the Navy is entitled to consider: a 27 year
old petty officer had repeated sexual relations with a 19 year old seaman recruit. The
latter then chose to break off the relationship. Episodes of this sort are certain to be
deleterious to morale and discipline, to call into question the even-handedness of
superiors' dealings with lower ranks, to make personal dealings uncomfortable where
the relationship is sexually ambiguous, to generate dislike and disapproval among many
who find homosexuality morally offensive, and, it must be said, given the powers of
military superiors over their inferiors, to enhance the possibility of homosexual
seduction.
Id.at 1398.
113. UNIFORM CODE OF MILrrARY JusTIcE art. 134, § 83 (Fraternization), 10 U.S.C. § 934
(1988). The offense of fraternization in the military is committed when an officer, warrant officer, or in some cases a non-commissioned officer fraternizes with enlisted members on terms of
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3. The Regulation Upholds Privacy Interests of
Servicemembers
The regulation excluding homosexuals states the presence of gays
in the military invades the privacy of heterosexual servicemen.11 4 The
D.C. Circuit observed that the regulation means either that gay servicemembers will look at heterosexuals in the shower or other less
private quarters, or that heterosexuals will dread such staring." 5 The
court dismissed these concerns by first viewing them in the same manner as it did the presumption that one who is gay will engage in sexual
acts." 6 The court went on to say that this is also similar to giving
"effect to the irrational fears and stereotypes of third parties" which
Palmore and Cleburne foreclose."

7

In addition, the court pointed to an apparent contradiction in the
Navy's arguments. The Navy, during oral arguments, declared that a
"celibate homosexual" could serve alongside heterosexuals without
problems as long as they kept their thoughts to themselves." 8 The
court questioned how the regulation upholds privacy, when a homosexual might very well be showering next to a heterosexual." 9
Though the court correctly concludes that privacy is not a solid
basis for the regulation, its arguments are for the most part, less than
persuasive. The court's conclusion that the Palmore/Cleburnerationale also forestalls using privacy as a legitimate purpose for the regulation can be viewed in the same light as discussed earlier. Again the
court gives little constitutional basis for this assertion. If this is to be
the clear rule as applied to homosexuals, the court should have put
military equality, to the prejudice of good order and discipline, or brings discredit upon the
armed forces. Id.

114. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, § 1.H.1.a (1993). "The presence of such members adversely
affects the ability of the Military Services .... to facilitate assignments and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close condition affording
minimal privacy." Ld.
115. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57,69 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated andreh'g in banc granted,8 F.3d
70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
116. "The argument that homosexuals will stare is very similar to the argument that they will

engage in homosexual acts. Again, it equates thoughts and desires with propensity to engage in
misconduct." Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
119. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 69. "[I]f the Navy is not concerned about heterosexual servicemembers perceiving an invasion of privacy from the presence of a 'celibate homosexual,'
then the marginal increase in invasiveness from a homosexual who 'lusts in his heart' but does
not intend conduct should be minimal." Id.
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more emphasis on its importance. In an unspectacular manner, it settles for an eight word conclusion. 120 As to its final statement that the
Navy makes an apparently contradictory claim, the court finally
slammed the door on privacy as a basis for the regulation. Not only
does it point out the poor "lawyering" of the Navy, but it firmly concludes that the regulation does not accomplish one of its stated
12
purposes. 1
Apparently, however, the D.C. Circuit failed to rebut both possible meanings of the Navy's articulated purpose."2 While the Palmorel
Cleburne rational prevents the fears of others that homosexuals will
leer from being a valid purpose behind the regulation, the court did
not attack the alternative meaning that homosexual servicemembers
will actually stare at their heterosexual counterparts. To be sure,
homosexuals may do that very thing. However, this presupposes that
homosexuals will be sexually attracted to heterosexuals under any circumstance. Granted, a homosexual may be sexually attracted to a
heterosexual as complete strangers, but it would seem that homosexuals are no more attracted to those they know are heterosexual, as
heterosexuals are to those they know to be gay. Not to mention the
fact that homosexuals surely find certain acquaintances unattractive
just as heterosexuals do. 23 Furthermore, sexual leering is not sufficient conduct to justify the regulation. Nevertheless, when a servicemember acts upon his or her attractions, he or she should face the
consequences of improper conduct.
A rationale raised in the district court, but not addressed by the
D.C. Circuit was that the military separates men and women for privacy reasons.' 24 Two striking flaws accompany this argument. First,
this statement is not a valid comparison. The regulation makes no
provisions for separating homosexuals and heterosexuals. Neither
group has the option of living separately from the other; homosexuals
are simply discharged.
120. "That argument is foreclosed by Palmore and Cleburne." Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 69.
121. "Thus, even if the privacy rational were legitimate in the abstract, these Directives
plainly do not protect privacy." Id.
122. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
123. It also seems ironic that women have complained about this very behavior from men
with little change, but here, when men become the object of sexual leering, much is made of the
seriousness of such behavior.
124. "In the Military Establishment and for those who attend the Naval Academy, the policy
of separating men and women while sleeping, bathing, and 'using the bathroom' seeks to maintain the privacy of officers and the enlisted when in certain states of undress." Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
vacated and reh'gin banc granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
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Second, the policy of separating the sexes is based not only on the
possible embarrassment of being naked in front of the opposite sex, or
to avoid sexual conduct, but also the elementary physiological difference between men and women. Embarrassment cannot be a reason,
since no such physiological difference exists between the same sex,
and any prohibited sexual conduct should be punished regardless of
whom it is.
The district court noted that "the most significant policy separating the sexes in the Navy is that which excludes women from combat."' This proposition clearly has no relevance to the discussion.
First, the reasons for the policy excluding women from combat roles
has nothing to do with excluding gays from the military in a strict
sense. Second, even during the United States' most recent major military conflict, the Persian Gulf War, the military delayed the discharge
of homosexuals until the completion of the war because of operational
necessities. 26 Third, it holds even less weight now because on April
28, 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that women
would be allowed to take positions that are considered traditional
combat roles.' 27
B.

The Court Looks For Other Rationales

After finding that none of the rationales proffered by the Navy
provided a basis for the regulation, the D.C. Circuit tried to determine, on its own, if there were any other unmentioned rationales that
could provide such a basis. The court observed that the district court
had examined the fear of the spread of AIDS as one rationale. The
district court took judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of
those who are HIV positive are homosexuals. 1' The court rejected
this as a basis by stating that being homosexual does not in itself
125. Id. at 13 n.21.
126. Wade Lambert, Gay GI's Told, Serve Now, Face DischargeLater, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
1991, at B1.
127. Aspin's order allows women for example to fly combat aircraft, serve in air-defense
units and aboard combat vessels. As recently as March 1994, the first of 500 women were assigned to the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Eisenhower. 60 Women Assigned to CarrierAre Firstfor a

Navy Combat Ship, WASH. Posr, March 7, 1994, at A4.
128. The district court relied on statistics from the Centers for Disease Control which, at the

time, stated "that of the AIDS cases reported through August 1991,59% of all adults and adolescents were exposed because they were men who had sex with other men." Steffan v. Cheney,
780 F. Supp. at 15. More recently, total adult/adolescent AIDS cases caused by men having sex
with men has dropped from 53% from October 1991-September 1992, to 48% from October
1992-September 1993. CDC Report, Surveillance Report HIVIAIDS, Third Quarter Ed. (Oct.
1993).
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spread AIDS. 12 9 However, on a more basic level, the D.C. Circuit did

not even address how the district court could find that preventing the
spread of AIDS provides a basis for excluding homosexuals.1 30 Nowhere does the regulation state that one of its purposes is to alleviate
such a risk and it would be unreasonable to imply that such a purpose
was at issue when the regulation was first adopted.
The D.C. Circuit also considered the potential susceptibility of
homosexuals to blackmail. 3 The court quickly pointed out that if
there is a danger here, the regulation itself is to blame.1 32 "The gay
ban raises the stake of silence enormously, and gives potential blackmailers leverage they would not otherwise have.21 33
C. The D.C. Circuit's Holding
With that, the court finally concluded that the Navy's regulation
caused Steffan to resign solely because he was gay.

34

Finding no ra-

tional basis for the regulation, the court held that Steffan's right to
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
was violated.13 5 The court ordered that the Navy award him his diploma from the Naval Academy and to commission him as an officer.'36 However, on January 7, 1994, the court voted to rehear the
entire case sitting en banc. The order granted to Steffan was immedi37
ately vacated.1

129. "Homosexual orientation cannot spread the AIDS virus. Homosexual or heterosexual,
conduct can - then only if one of the participants carries the AIDS virus." Steffan v. Aspin, 8
F.3d 57, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted, 8 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir 1994).
130. The district court argued "the defendant's policy of excluding homosexuals is rational in
that it is directed, in part, at preventing those who are at the greatest risk of dying of AIDS from

serving in the Navy and the other armed services." Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. at 16.
131. The court mentions that the regulation alludes to such a threat. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d
at 69. "The presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to...
prevent breaches of security." 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, § 1.H.1.a (1993).
132. "[T]he military's policy only increases the risk of blackmail by making gays and lesbians
remain in the closet for fear of forfeiting their careers." Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 69. (citing
Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957
(1990)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 70.
135. Id.
136. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 70.
137. Id.
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V.

STRICr SCRUTINY ANALYSIS SHOULD APPLY TO

HOMOSEXUALS

It is imperative that homosexuals be accorded suspect class status
so as to qualify for strict scrutiny under equal protection claims.
Although the Steffan court initially found the regulation could not
hold up against the rational basis test, satisfying this test does not impose a great burden on the Navy. As a result, it is possible that the
Navy will provide a "legitimate" purpose for its regulation when the
D.C. Circuit rehears the case en banc. Regardless of whether the
Navy can now create a legitimate purpose, the court should apply a
more rigid standard of review. It is important that the court take the
first step in ruling that laws which discriminate based on sexual orientation be subject to strict scrutiny by classifying homosexuals as a suspect class. 138 Accordingly, the Navy's regulation must be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest and must be the least restrictive alternative before it will be deemed constitutional.
A.

Homosexuals as a Suspect Class

Courts have looked to a number of factors to determine whether
a group should be classified as a suspect class.' 3 9 The factors are primarily, (1) a history of discrimination, (2) the particularly malicious
nature of the discrimination, and (3) the political power of the
140
group.
B. History of Discrimination
As a group, it is difficult to argue that homosexuals have not been
the target of sustained discrimination. However, not only must there
be discrimination, but there must also be a long history of discrimination that is invidious in nature. In one case, the military even conceded such a position.' 4 ' In sum, discrimination against homosexuals
has been extensive throughout public and private sectors, legislative
bodies, employment, housing, and religion. 42
138. In fact, the court may be much closer to taking this step than it realizes, since its decision was justified, in part, by constitutional principles reserved for equal protection challenges
that do not receive ordinary rational basis review. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
139. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).

140. Id. at 602.
141. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied 498

U.S. 957 (1990).
142. "[D]iscriniination faced by homosexuals is plainly no less pernicious or intense than the
discrimination faced by other groups already treated as suspect classes, such as aliens or people

of a particular national origin." Id.
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C. Discriminationof a ParticularlyMalicious Nature
As to the malicious and invidious nature of the discrimination,
courts often focus on immutable characteristics of the group.143 An
immutable trait may be described as those "that are so central to a
person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically."' 1 . The Steffan court did not reach
whether homosexuality is an immutable trait. However, the Watkins
court had "no trouble concluding that sexual orientation is immutable
for the purposes of equal protection doctrine.', 145 It is true that scientific evidence is not absolutely conclusive, but the increasing amount
of evidence suggests that sexual orientation is not derived by
choice.' 46 Yet, the Supreme Court has never required that an immutable trait be completely unalterable. 47 In fact, the possibility of such a
change does not make the trait mutable. 48
D. PoliticalPower of Homosexuals
Strict scrutiny accords protection to certain classes because they
lack meaningful power in the political process. The district court declared that homosexuals have a great deal of political power since they
have brought the national spotlight on the problem of AIDS. 49 In
addition, the district court noted that a number of cities have passed
anti-discrimination ordinances concerning homosexuals. 50 Equally
important, the court states that there are openly gay members of Congress. 5 ' In fact the district court went on to compare the number of
143. In practice, this qualification had rested on race or national origin. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
144. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
145. Id. But see High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (characterizing homosexuality as primarily behavioral).
146. See, eg., Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexuals
and Homosexual Men, 253 ScL 1034 (1991); Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic

Study of Male Sexual Orientation,48 ARCHIVES GN. PSYCHIATRY 1089 (1991).
147. Cf. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the

Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994) (characterizing arguments over biological causation of homosexuality as irrelevant, since immutability does not require an individual to be born with the trait).
148. For example, "[pleople can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily
become naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate children can be changed." Watkins, 875
F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
149. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F.Supp. 1, 8 n.14 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin,
8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g in banc granted,8 F.3d 70 (D.C Cir. 1994).
150. Id. at n.15.
151. Id. at 9.
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openly gay congressmen to the number of doctdrs who are congressmen, to make the point that although there are very few of both, doctors have great political power, and consequently so must gays. 52
Meeting this requirement should be far less important. The most
striking point about the element is that it is obvious that determining
when a class has crossed that magical line of having political power is
difficult. The three arguments proffered by the district court in no
way show that gays have meaningful political power. The fact that
homosexuals have brought the AIDS crisis into the public spotlight
shows only that homosexuals can be vocal when need be. Moreover,
it is reasonable to assume that the group that has suffered the most
from the disease would necessarily be the ones to bring their plight to
the public eye. The fact that a few cities have enacted anti-discrimination ordinances shows only that some municipalities recognize that
one's sexual orientation has nothing to do with one's ability to be a
1 53
productive member of society.
Finally, it is erroneous to say that because few doctor/congressmen have political power, that the openly gay congressmen provide
equal political power to homosexuals in general. The district court
ignored the reality of the situation. Counting congressmen is not necessarily an appropriate measuring stick of political power; not to mention that getting the attention of a congressman, thus gaining political
power, is difficult without a strong lobby.' 54 Granted, homosexuals
are gaining political power, but regardless where that magical line that
a class finally has real power is drawn, it seems hard to argue that
homosexuals have any significant power today.

152. Id.
153. In High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377-78 (8th
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc) the dissent noted that isolated
anti-discrimination ordinances do not deprive homosexuals of the status of a suspect classification. The dissent also questioned how any other conclusion could be made. The dissent pointed
out that blacks are a suspect class, but "are protected by three federal constitutional amendments, major federal Civil Rights Act[s] .... as well as antidiscrimination laws in 48 of the states.
By that comparison, and by absolute standards as well, homosexuals are politically powerless."
Id at 378.
154. "Certainly homosexuals as a class wield less political power than blacks, a suspect classification, or women, a quasi-suspect one. One can easily find examples of major political parties'
openly tailoring their position to appeal to black voters, and to female voters. One cannot find
comparable examples of appeals to homosexual voters; homosexuals are regarded by the national parties as political pariahs." Id.
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CONCLUSION

When President Bill Clinton announced his new "Don't ask,
don't tell, don't pursue" policy on gays in the military,' 5 it was a serious step back from his 1992 campaign pledge to remove the ban on
homosexuals from the military. The policy was seen as a compromise
between a new president with little military experience and obstinate
military leadership. Calling his policy "a real step forward,"'1 56 the
President actually misrepresented an element of the policy' 5 7 and imposed a presumption that the Steffan court specifically refused to
accept.1SS
President Truman, against equally firm opposition, ordered that
the military be fully integrated. Time has proven his decision correct.
Blacks have made tremendous strides in the military, not to mention
that Colin Powell held the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position under two administrations, and played an integral role in leading
our forces to victory in the Persian Gulf. If President Clinton is unwilling to make such an order fully integrating homosexuals into the
military, then the courts must step forward to activate such a process.
The military's ban on homosexuals is not only irrational, but may
even have the effect of depriving this country of valuable servicemen
and leaders. Had any of the leaders mentioned in the introduction
been gay, and the military known about it, men who survived World
War II may have died, the Confederate Army may have never given
such a valiant fight against insurmountable odds, young blacks may
not have had such a great role model, and Japan may not have become
a booming capitalistic country. While each of these is admittedly farfetched, the military's justification for its regulation is equally farfetched. The Steffan court must not only declare the military's policy
unconstitutional, but it must also find that strict scrutiny should be
applied to equal protection claims made by homosexuals.
155. President's Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the Military,
29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1369-73 (July 19, 1993).
156. Id. at 1369.

157. "One, service men and women will be judged based on their conduct, not their sexual
orientation." Id at 1372. This is not true. Homosexuals will be judged on their conduct up until
the day they are discovered to be homosexual-then they will be discharged.
158. "Three, an open statement by a service member that he or she is a homosexual will
create a rebuttable presumption that he or she intends to engage in prohibited conduct, but the
service member will be given an opportunity to refute that presumption." Id.This element does
not alter the present regulation in any way, as one who admits homosexuality "may" already
introduce evidence that they really are not homosexual. But see supra note 89.
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America's hallmark has been to judge people by what they do, and
not by who they are. Just as Mr. Steffan won his Battalion Commander ranking by his conduct, so must he be judged by his conduct. It is fundamentally unjust to abort a most promising military
career solely because of a truthful confession of a sexual preference
different from that of the majority, a preference untarnished by
even a scintilla of misconduct. 159
Gary Frost

159. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57,70 (D.C.Cir. 1993), vacatedand reh'g in banc granted,8 F.3d
70 (D.C Cir. 1994).
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